An Equilibrium Study about Spectrum between "Winner's Curse" and Seller's Earnings Based on Uniform-Price Auction

An Equilibrium Study about Spectrum between "Winner's Curse" and Seller's Earnings Based on Uniform-Price Auction

The auction mechanism of spectrum becomes the focus in China with the issuance of 3G license. The uniform-price auctions which aim to reduce the risk of "winner's curse" and the protection of seller's earnings are proposed to in this paper. A model of seller's earnings and t...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Hauptverfasser: Jing Sun, Qizhu Song, Tingjie Lu
Format: Tagungsbericht
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Cost accounting
FCC
Government
Information science
Licenses
Oil drilling
Protection
Sun
Online-Zugang:Volltext bestellen
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:The auction mechanism of spectrum becomes the focus in China with the issuance of 3G license. The uniform-price auctions which aim to reduce the risk of "winner's curse" and the protection of seller's earnings are proposed to in this paper. A model of seller's earnings and the relevant influent factors is established. The equilibrium status which can reduce the risk of "winner's curse" and guarantee the seller's earnings is also mentioned in this paper.
ISSN:2160-1283
DOI:10.1109/ICISE.2009.260