Exploiting Untrustworthy Agents in Team Formation

Exploiting Untrustworthy Agents in Team Formation

This paper presents a trust-based mechanism for team formation wherein agents selectively pursue partners of varying trustworthiness. The mechanism is tested by using a market-based simulation to determine how pursuing partners with different trust ratings affects an agent's utility. Results fr...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Hauptverfasser: Jones, C.L.D., Fullam, K.K., Barber, S.
Format: Tagungsbericht
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Collaboration
Collaborative work
Equations
Intelligent agent
Intelligent systems
Internet
Laboratories
Proposals
Testing
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:This paper presents a trust-based mechanism for team formation wherein agents selectively pursue partners of varying trustworthiness. The mechanism is tested by using a market-based simulation to determine how pursuing partners with different trust ratings affects an agent's utility. Results from these experiments show that for jobs with few subtasks, an agent profits by selecting less trustworthy partners, rather than more trustworthy partners.
DOI:10.1109/IAT.2007.96