Distributed Cyber Resilient Control Strategy for Remote DC Microgrids Under Integrated Satellite Terrestrial Networks

Remote dc microgrids under integrated satellite terrestrial networks (ISTNs) as typical cyber-physical systems are vulnerable to cyberattacks and noises due to its broadcast nature and atmospheric interference. In this article, a distributed cyber resilient control strategy is proposed for such microgrids against denial of service (DoS) attacks and inherent noises associated with ISTNs. First, an intermediate observer is employed in each distributed generator (DG) to estimate its neighbors' voltages and power sharing considering ISTN noises and DoS attacks. Then, a distributed resilient algorithm with a compensation component is proposed to mitigate the adverse effects of ISTN noises even with DoS attacks. It is theoretically demonstrated that the proposed control strategy can achieve voltage restoration and accurate power sharing in the presence of ISTN noises and DoS attacks. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed control strategy is validated by extensive case studies conducted on the real-time OPAL-RT with digital signal processor controllers.