Political foundations of the resource curse: A simplification and a comment

In this note we show how a considerably simpler model than the one in our original JDE 2006 paper generates all the same results. We also acknowledge an error in the specification of a utility function in our previous paper. •We simplify a political economy theory of the resource curse.•Natural reso...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Journal of development economics 2014-01, Vol.106, p.194-198
Hauptverfasser:	Robinson, James A., Torvik, Ragnar, Verdier, Thierry
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Clientelism Economic models Economic resources Economic theory Economics and Finance Error Humanities and Social Sciences Natural resources Political economy Studies Utility functions
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:	In this note we show how a considerably simpler model than the one in our original JDE 2006 paper generates all the same results. We also acknowledge an error in the specification of a utility function in our previous paper. •We simplify a political economy theory of the resource curse.•Natural resources increase income when institutions are strong.•Natural resources may decease income when institutions are weak.
ISSN:	0304-3878 1872-6089
DOI:	10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.09.004