When could Macroprudential and Monetary Policies be in Conflict?

This paper aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the potential conflicts between macroprudential and monetary policies within a DGSE model with financial frictions. The identification of conflicts is conditional on different types of shocks, policy instruments, and policy objectives. We first...

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Veröffentlicht in:Journal of banking & finance 2022-06, Vol.139, p.106484, Article 106484
Hauptverfasser: Garcia Revelo, Jose D., Levieuge, Grégory
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Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:This paper aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the potential conflicts between macroprudential and monetary policies within a DGSE model with financial frictions. The identification of conflicts is conditional on different types of shocks, policy instruments, and policy objectives. We first find that conflicts are not systematic but are fairly frequent, especially in the case of supply-side and widespread shocks such as investment efficiency and bank capital shocks. Second, monetary policy and countercyclical capital requirements generate conflicts in many circumstances. By affecting interest rates, they both “get in all the cracks”, albeit with their respective targets generally moving in opposite directions. Nonetheless, monetary policy could reduce its adverse financial side effects by responding strongly to the output gap. Third, countercyclical loan-to-value caps, as sector-specific instruments, cause fewer conflicts. Thus, they can be more easily implemented without concerns about generating spillovers, whereas smooth coordination is required between state-contingent capital requirements and monetary policy.
ISSN:0378-4266
1872-6372
DOI:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2022.106484