On the logical form and ontology of inferences in conversational implicatures

This paper is about the pragmatic inferences in play as conversational implicatures (Grice, P. 1989. . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press) occur. First, it constructs the deductivism versus abductivism debate that transpires from the extant literature but is rarely elaborated. Against deductivism, the paper argues that implicating inferences in conversational implicatures can instantiate an abductive logical form, as abductivism suggests. Against abductivism, however, it grants to deductivism that implicating inferences can have a deductive form provided the latter is of a defeasible type. In sum, it thus argues for . Second, it turns to the issue of the ontological nature of implicating inferences and advocates , on which these inferences are not primarily real psychological processes but rules of the practice of implicating. While this allows for the possibility of their psychological instantiation, to be sure, the paper also insists that psychological inferring processes in implicatures are neither necessarily isomorphic to the aforementioned rules nor even necessarily occur as an implicature occurs.