On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties

In this paper, we introduce a sufficient condition on the domain of admissible preferences of a social choice mechanism under which the properties of individual and coalitional strategyproofness are equivalent. Then, we illustrate the usefulness of this general result in the case where a fixed budge...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Social choice and welfare 2009-08, Vol.33 (2), p.287-309
Hauptverfasser:	Le Breton, Michel, Zaporozhets, Vera
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Budget allocation Budgets Circles Coalitions Dictators Dictatorship Dominant strategy Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Economics and Finance Euclidean space Game Theory Humanities and Social Sciences International Political Economy Logical theorems Mathematical functions Mechanism design Original Paper Preferences Public choice Public Finance Public Goods Resource Allocation Social and Behav. Sciences Social Choice Social conditions & trends Social Policy Strategic planning Studies
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:	In this paper, we introduce a sufficient condition on the domain of admissible preferences of a social choice mechanism under which the properties of individual and coalitional strategyproofness are equivalent. Then, we illustrate the usefulness of this general result in the case where a fixed budget has to be allocated among several pure public goods.
ISSN:	0176-1714 1432-217X
DOI:	10.1007/s00355-008-0358-0