Analysis of loss of offsite power events reported in nuclear power plants
•Loss of offsite power events were identified in four databases.•Engineering analysis of relevant events was done.•The dominant root cause for LOOP are human failures.•Improved maintenance procedures can decrease the number of LOOP events. This paper presents the results of analysis of the loss of o...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Nuclear engineering and design 2016-10, Vol.307, p.234-248 |
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Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | •Loss of offsite power events were identified in four databases.•Engineering analysis of relevant events was done.•The dominant root cause for LOOP are human failures.•Improved maintenance procedures can decrease the number of LOOP events.
This paper presents the results of analysis of the loss of offsite power events (LOOP) in four databases of operational events. The screened databases include: the Gesellschaft für Anlagen und Reaktorsicherheit mbH (GRS) and Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN) databases, the IAEA International Reporting System for Operating Experience (IRS) and the U.S. Licensee Event Reports (LER).
In total 228 relevant loss of offsite power events were identified in the IRSN database, 190 in the GRS database, 120 in U.S. LER and 52 in IRS database. Identified events were classified in predefined categories.
Obtained results show that the largest percentage of LOOP events is registered during On power operational mode and lasted for two minutes or more. The plant centered events is the main contributor to LOOP events identified in IRSN, GRS and IAEA IRS database. The switchyard centered events are the main contributor in events registered in the NRC LER database. The main type of failed equipment is switchyard failures in IRSN and IAEA IRS, main or secondary lines in NRC LER and busbar failures in GRS database.
The dominant root cause for the LOOP events are human failures during test, inspection and maintenance followed by human failures due to the insufficient or wrong procedures. The largest number of LOOP events resulted in reactor trip followed by EDG start.
The actions that can result in reduction of the number of LOOP events and minimize consequences on plant safety are identified and presented. |
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ISSN: | 0029-5493 1872-759X |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.nucengdes.2016.07.005 |