The effect of executive stock option delta and vega on the spin-off decision

•Role of managerial incentives around organizational restructuring is investigated.•Stock option vega positively affects changes in firm value and riskiness.•Stock option delta negatively affects changes in firm value and riskiness.•Overall, executive incentives induce more conservative, low-risk investment choices. We investigate the role of CEO incentives around asset restructuring known as corporate spin-off. More specifically, we focus on executive stock option delta and vega vis-à-vis changes in firm value and firm riskiness in response to the corporate spin-off. Controlling for self-selection of the spin-off decision, we find that executive stock option vega is positively related to changes in firm value as well as changes in firm risk. Conversely, we find that executive stock option delta is negatively related to changes in firm value and firm risk. Finally, we estimate the Fazzari et al. (1988) investment model and show that at the business segment level, CEO incentives are positively linked to capital spending. Overall, our study extends the current literature by documenting the role of executive stock option delta and vega in the context of corporate spin-offs.