Limit Optimal Trajectories in Zero-Sum Stochastic Games

We consider zero-sum stochastic games. For every discount factor λ , a time normalization allows to represent the discounted game as being played during the interval [0, 1]. We introduce the trajectories of cumulated expected payoff and of cumulated occupation measure on the state space up to time t...

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Veröffentlicht in:Dynamic games and applications 2020-06, Vol.10 (2), p.555-572
Hauptverfasser: Sorin, Sylvain, Vigeral, Guillaume
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:We consider zero-sum stochastic games. For every discount factor λ , a time normalization allows to represent the discounted game as being played during the interval [0, 1]. We introduce the trajectories of cumulated expected payoff and of cumulated occupation measure on the state space up to time t ∈ [ 0 , 1 ] , under ε -optimal strategies. A limit optimal trajectory is defined as an accumulation point as ( λ , ε ) tend to 0. We study existence, uniqueness and characterization of these limit optimal trajectories for compact absorbing games.
ISSN:2153-0785
2153-0793
DOI:10.1007/s13235-019-00333-z