An automatically vetting mechanism for SSL error-handling vulnerability in android hybrid Web apps

A large set of diverse hybrid mobile apps, which use both native Android app UIs and Web UIs, are widely available in today’s smartphones. These hybrid apps usually use SSL or TLS to secure HTTP based communication. However, researchers show that incorrect implementation of SSL or TLS may lead to se...

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Veröffentlicht in:World wide web (Bussum) 2018, Vol.21 (1), p.127-150
Hauptverfasser: Liu, Yang, Zuo, Chaoshun, Zhang, Zonghua, Guo, Shanqing, Xu, Xinshun
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:A large set of diverse hybrid mobile apps, which use both native Android app UIs and Web UIs, are widely available in today’s smartphones. These hybrid apps usually use SSL or TLS to secure HTTP based communication. However, researchers show that incorrect implementation of SSL or TLS may lead to serious security problems, such as Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attacks and phishing attacks. This paper investigates a particular SSL vulnerability that results from error-handling code in the hybrid mobile Web apps. Usually such error-handling code is used to terminate an ongoing communication, but the vulnerability of interest is able to make the communication proceed regardless of SSL certificate verification failures, eventually lead to MITM attacks. To identify those vulnerable apps, we develop a hybrid approach, which combines both static analysis and dynamic analysis to (1) automatically distinguish the native Android UIs and Web UIs, and execute the Web UIs to trigger the error-handling code; (2) accurately select the correct paths from the app entry-point to the targeted code, meanwhile avoiding the crash of apps, and populate messaging objects for the communication between components. Specifically, we construct inter-component call graphs to model the connections, and design algorithms to select the paths from the established graph and determine the parameters by backtracing. To evaluate our approach, we have implemented and tested it with 13,820 real world mobile Web apps from Google Play. The experimental results demonstrate that 1,360 apps are detected as potentially vulnerable ones solely using the static analysis. The dynamic analysis process further confirms that 711 apps are truly vulnerable among the potentially vulnerable set.
ISSN:1386-145X
1573-1413
DOI:10.1007/s11280-017-0458-9