Relational contracts as a foundation for contractual incompleteness

Relational contracts as a foundation for contractual incompleteness

Contractual incompleteness is generally defined by a trade-off between costs and benefits. We examine this trade-off in a dynamic setting and show how the ability of the parties to sustain a relational contract leads to more incomplete contracts.

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Veröffentlicht in:Economics bulletin 2011-01, Vol.31 (3), p.2030-2040
Hauptverfasser: Desrieux, Claudine, Beuve, Jean
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Contractual incompleteness
Economics and Finance
Humanities and Social Sciences
Relational Contract
Repeated Games
Reputation
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Zusammenfassung:Contractual incompleteness is generally defined by a trade-off between costs and benefits. We examine this trade-off in a dynamic setting and show how the ability of the parties to sustain a relational contract leads to more incomplete contracts.
ISSN:1545-2921
1545-2921