Learning in the trust game

Learning in the trust game

We use experimental data from a repeated trust game to estimate structural learning models that allow a differentiation of the learning processes of the two players. We find that the two players cannot be described by the same learning process. Long run simulations then show that the interaction of...

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Veröffentlicht in:Revue de philosophie économique 2012-06, Vol.13 (1), p.155-174
Hauptverfasser: Meidinger, Claude, Terracol, Antoine
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Economics and Finance
Humanities and Social Sciences
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container_title Revue de philosophie économique
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creator Meidinger, Claude
Terracol, Antoine
description We use experimental data from a repeated trust game to estimate structural learning models that allow a differentiation of the learning processes of the two players. We find that the two players cannot be described by the same learning process. Long run simulations then show that the interaction of the two estimated types of players can lead to contrasted outcomes.
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subjects Economics and Finance
Humanities and Social Sciences
title Learning in the trust game
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