Learning in the trust game
We use experimental data from a repeated trust game to estimate structural learning models that allow a differentiation of the learning processes of the two players. We find that the two players cannot be described by the same learning process. Long run simulations then show that the interaction of...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Revue de philosophie économique 2012-06, Vol.13 (1), p.155-174 |
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| Hauptverfasser: | , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
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| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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| Zusammenfassung: | We use experimental data from a repeated trust game to estimate structural learning models that allow a differentiation of the learning processes of the two players. We find that the two players cannot be described by the same learning process. Long run simulations then show that the interaction of the two estimated types of players can lead to contrasted outcomes. |
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| ISSN: | 1376-0971 2118-4852 |