ON PLASTICITY'S OWN CONCEPTUAL EPIGENESIS: MALABOU ON THE ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF PLASTICITY

This paper proposes an immanent critique of Catherine Malabou's account of the origin of plasticity, arguing that Malabou's account of plasticity--as a philosophical concept or form--does not meet the standard of her own conception of the epigenetic development of form. Using Malabou's Before Tomorrow: Epigenesis and Rationality, this paper argues that Malabou's own account of plasticity hews closer to theories of formation Malabou explicitly abjures: spontaneous generation and preformationism. Accordingly, Malabou's articulation of plasticity lacks an account of its conceptual epigenesis that would fulfill the epigenetic standards of her own thinking. First, we will characterize the origin and history of plasticity as described by Malabou as consisting of two primary claims: plasticity arrives in and with Hegel, and that it is through Hegel's substantialization of plasticity that it becomes a concept. Plasticity first emerges in Hegel and that it becomes-substantive through Hegel, attaining the dignity of a proper philosophical concept. We then move to an exegesis of Malabou's account of theories of generation in her analysis of Kantian epigenesis in Before Tomorrow, arguing that the extant account of plasticity provided by Malabou resembles paradigms of formation she rejects. Lastly, we sketch out some possible pathways to explore to furnish the epigenetic becoming-substantive of plasticity currently missing in Malabou's account. KEYWORDS: Malabou; Plasticity; Epigenesis