PRACTICES OF GOVERNANCE IN THE POLICY OF BUSINESS SUCCESSION: FAMILY IN CONTROL?/PRÁTICAS DE GOVERNANÇA NA POLÍTICA DE SUCESSÃO EMPRESARIAL: A FAMÍLIA NO CONTROLE?

Objective: The process of succession and professionalization of the family business demanded a change in its structure of ownership and control, which implies the reconfiguration of power relations - what can be called "corporate governance". In this research, he studied the company through its different stages of development of its history, characterized in terms of property distribution, the type of management and compliance with the provisions of governance practices and the promotion of an appropriate level of professionalism in its management. Methodology: The present research is exploratory, with a qualitative approach, based on the Case Study method. This type of approach involves interviews and observations, resulting in descriptions of results and impressions of events. In this interview, conducted in March 2018, a script was used, with topics and issues divided into six thematic blocks (ownership, conflicts, family, succession, professionalization, and company), containing a total of ten open questions and eight closed questions. Results: The investigation is also related to the importance of the issue in relation to the opportunistic behavior of executives in companies. In most research, the emphasis is on agency problems, caused by the separation of ownership and management into large corporations. The factor of Brazil being an emerging country where la ck of a strict legal system and control factors against corruption in these environments and public sectors emphasizes the importance of applying the " Practices of Corporate Governance " in the main developed countries, the which reflects the need for effective supervisory bodies that contribute to a better financial performance of companies family's. Contributions: As a theoretical contribution, the authors intend to complement the financial and stock market, finance and strategic research using agency theory and measuring market performance a nd board influence, which is rarely studied in this context family. It wa s therefore concluded that the pressure exerted by the controllin g shareholder and other internal directors would contribute to reducing the positive impact of family on performance. As social and empirical contributions, it will bring a better understanding of this issue in the emerging countries, which are the peculiarities in the Brazilia n scenario, expanding the discussion when addressing an influential factor in the performance of companies family's (council independence) st