Labor's Antitrust Problem: A Case for Worker Welfare
The common-law definition of "employee" has been subject to increased scrutiny after accusations that companies, notably Uber and Lyft, deprive workers of benefits by classifying them as independent contractors. States have responded by broadening the definition of "employee," bu...
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Veröffentlicht in: | The Yale law journal 2020-11, Vol.130 (2), p.428-476 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | The common-law definition of "employee" has been subject to increased scrutiny after accusations that companies, notably Uber and Lyft, deprive workers of benefits by classifying them as independent contractors. States have responded by broadening the definition of "employee," but these workers remain subject to antitrust liability for organizing. This Note demonstrates that such worker liability is economically suboptimal and inconsistent with legislative history, and that antitrust law must preserve worker welfare. Returning to the liability currently faced by independent contractors, this Note proposes a two-pronged approach, based in federal agency guidance and state legislation, for importing a broader definition of "employee" into the antitrust context. |
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ISSN: | 0044-0094 1939-8611 |