Fuel distribution in the state of Sao Paulo, Brazil: governance structures and complementary coordination mechanisms/Distribuicao de combustivel no estado de Sao Paulo: estruturas de governanca e mecanismos complementares de coordenacao/ Distribucion de combustible en el estado de Sao Paulo, Brasil: estructuras de gobernanza y mecanismos de coordinacion complementarios

The paper is dedicated to the study of transactions governances adopted by fuel distributors with retailers stations, according to the theoretical approach of the New Institutional Economics. The work conducted field interviews with 25 distribution companies, which account for approximately 80% of domestic sales of gasoline and ethanol. The results suggest that the governance structures differ by asset specificity and that hybrid governances are the most frequent. The conclusions also indicate that the size of distributors is decisive in the choice of coordination mechanisms used and that the delay in enforcing contracts is the main cause of the emergence of complementary mechanisms, their use being primarily directed to the protection of specific assets in transactions.