Who Can Fish What and Where: Chile's Tradeoffs in High Seas Fishing of Straddling Stocks

Chile has not yet ratified the U.N. 1995 Agreement on straddling/highly migratory fish stocks. This paper discusses key economic issues at stake from the viewpoint of a coastal state with important stakes in a straddling stock. The Chilean jack mackerel stock, one of Chile's most important fish resources, is in this category. This stock is currently caught on adjacent high-seas only by a Chilean-flag fleet, and currently there is no evidence of imminent competition from distant water fishing nations (DWFNs). We argue that ratification of the Agreement could imply negative effects on: (i) coastal states ' sovereignty upon management measures within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and (ii) national fishing companies' competitiveness. Despite this, the net cost/benefit balance depends on how binding the threat of DWFNs' fishing competition is expected to be. If the Agreement does go into force, coastal states with important stakes in straddling fish stocks will feel increased pressure to ratify as well. For the case of states that become parties to the Agreement, we discuss pending obstacles for achieving effective fishery management in the adjacent high-seas. We speculate about possible solutions to the 'New Member' and 'Interloper' problems. Regarding the former, enforceable closed access would seem to be legally feasible under the Agreement. In terms of effective enforcement against fishing by illegal interlopers, innovation in enforcement tools would be needed. In some cases, the latter may require further adjustments to the Law of the Sea Convention.