What is international human rights law?: Three applications of a distributive account

The standard account of international human rights law is that its overarching mission is to protect universal features of what it means to be a human being from the exercise of sovereign power. This article offers an altemative account of the field, one that locates its normative dimensions in its capacity to speak to distributive injustices produced by how international law brings legal order to international political reality. On this account, human rights possess international legal significance not because they correspond to abstract conceptions of what it means to be human but because they monitor the distributive justice of the structure and operation of the international legal order itself. This account both draws on and departs from cosmopolitan conceptions of distributive justice in contemporary international political theory. It sheds normative light on why some human rights merit international legal protection despite the fact that they might lack some of the properties required by a universal account of the field. It illustrates these claims by describing how indigenous rights, minority rights, and rights to international co-operation and assistance mitigate some of the adverse consequences of how international law distributes sovereign power among a variety of legal actors it recognizes as states.