Category Signaling and Reputation

Category Signaling and Reputation

We propose that category membership can operate as a collective market signal for quality when low-quality producers face higher costs of gaining membership. The strength of membership as a collective signal increases with the sharpness of the category boundary, that is, contrast . Our empirical stu...

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Veröffentlicht in:Organization science (Providence, R.I.) R.I.), 2015-03, Vol.26 (2), p.584-600
Hauptverfasser: Negro, Giacomo, Hannan, Michael T., Fassiotto, Magali
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Alsace
Analysis
Berries
categories
Membership
Memberships
Organic farming
Organization theory
Reputation
Reputations
Signaling
sociology of markets
Studies
wine industry
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:We propose that category membership can operate as a collective market signal for quality when low-quality producers face higher costs of gaining membership. The strength of membership as a collective signal increases with the sharpness of the category boundary, that is, contrast . Our empirical study focuses on biodynamic and organic viticulture in Alsace.
ISSN:1047-7039
1526-5455
DOI:10.1287/orsc.2014.0935