Perception and enactivism in Merleau-Ponty and Francisco Varela/ Percepcao e enativismo em Merleau-Ponty e Francisco Varela

Perception, Merleau-Ponty argues, must be understood less as a representation of disassociated inputs and more as an unreflected bodily apprehension of Gestalten. Such thesis finds continuity in the context of cognitive sciences on the critique of representationalism of the enactivist paradigm, formulated by Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson e Eleanor Rosche in Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience (1991). To demonstrate and examine the enactive approach, pointing out its confluence with Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, is the goal of the article. KEY-WORDS Merleau-Ponty. Francisco Varela. Perception. Enactivism A percepcao, argumenta Merleau-Ponty, deve ser entendida menos como uma representacao de inputs desassociados e mais como uma apreensao corporal irrefletida de Gestalten. Tal formulacao encontra continuidade no contexto das ciencias cognitivas na critica ao representacionismo efetivada pelo paradigma do enativismo, assim formulado por Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson e Eleanor Rosche em Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience (1991). Demonstrar e examinar a abordagem enativista, apontando sua harmonia com a fenomenologia de Merleau-Ponty, constitui o objetivo do presente artigo. PALAVRAS-CHAVE Merleau-Ponty. Francisco Varela. Percepcao. Enativismo