The Indulgence of Reasonable Presumptions: Federal Court Contractual Civil Jury Trial Waivers

Large institutions such as banks, franchisers, international companies, and lessors distrust juries' ability to properly resolve disputes and award reasonable damages. As a result, these and other actors have attempted to limit juries' potential influence on the contracts to which they are parties. They have done so through contractual jury trial waiver clauses in these agreements. This Note argues that in the case of federal contractual jury trial waiver disputes, courts should adhere only to a permissive presumption in favor of jury trials. Part I contends that Aetna is best understood as establishing a permissive presumption rather than a mandatory burden-of-production-shifting presumption. Part II argues that multiple policy reasons weigh in favor of adhering to a permissive presumption rather than a mandatory burden-of-production-shifting presumption.