Regulatory arbitrage and the persistence of financial misconduct

Financial-advisor misconduct often has devastating consequences, leading lawmakers to seek tightened investor protections at the federal level. But many advisors can choose whether to be regulated under the federal regime or instead be overseen by state insurance regulators, giving advisors with a h...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Stanford law review 2022-04, Vol.74 (4), p.737-792
Hauptverfasser: Honigsberg, Colleen, Hu, Edwin, Jackson, Robert J., Jr
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:Financial-advisor misconduct often has devastating consequences, leading lawmakers to seek tightened investor protections at the federal level. But many advisors can choose whether to be regulated under the federal regime or instead be overseen by state insurance regulators, giving advisors with a history of misconduct reason to select the laxer state-level regulatory environment. Despite extensive debate over the regulation of financial advice, no prior work has examined those incentives. Using a novel dataset, this article identifies thousands of financial advisors who have committed serious misconduct and exited the federal regulatory regime - yet continue to advise investors, often using state insurance licenses. Because lobbying has blurred the line between financial advice and insurance sales, current law lets wayward advisors continue to provide similar services under state insurance regulators' light touch. We show that advisors who do this are disproportionately likely to harm investors in the future. And they are overwhelmingly male: women who have committed serious misconduct are more likely to exit financial services entirely. Our analysis identifies a limit of federal lawmaking in this area. Federal regulators necessarily rely on state regulators, who may become beholden to the interests of the insurance industry itself rather than the public. We show that more than one in ten state legislators who oversee insurance regulation are now, or were previously, in the business of selling insurance. We argue that existing tools for federal regulation of advisor misconduct risk the unintended consequence of pushing the worst advisors into poorly regulated state regimes.
ISSN:0038-9765
1939-8581