Selling Less Information for More: Garbling with Benefits

The expected value of information in a standard portfolio investment problem with ex-post payment can increase when the information is garbled prior to its sale. Distorting the information helps to resolve the incentive problem decreasing the buyer’s default risk and thereby increasing the seller’s...

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Hauptverfasser:	Weber, Thomas A, Croson, David C
Format:	Web Resource
Sprache:	eng
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creator	Weber, Thomas A Croson, David C
description	The expected value of information in a standard portfolio investment problem with ex-post payment can increase when the information is garbled prior to its sale. Distorting the information helps to resolve the incentive problem decreasing the buyer’s default risk and thereby increasing the seller’s expected revenues.
doi_str_mv	10.1016/j.econlet.2003.11.003
format	Web Resource
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identifier	DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2003.11.003
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source	Infoscience: EPF Lausanne
title	Selling Less Information for More: Garbling with Benefits
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