Selling Less Information for More: Garbling with Benefits
The expected value of information in a standard portfolio investment problem with ex-post payment can increase when the information is garbled prior to its sale. Distorting the information helps to resolve the incentive problem decreasing the buyer’s default risk and thereby increasing the seller’s...
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| Hauptverfasser: | , |
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| Format: | Web Resource |
| Sprache: | eng |
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| Zusammenfassung: | The expected value of information in a standard portfolio investment problem with ex-post payment can increase when the information is garbled prior to its sale. Distorting the information helps to resolve the incentive problem decreasing the buyer’s default risk and thereby increasing the seller’s expected revenues. |
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| DOI: | 10.1016/j.econlet.2003.11.003 |