Corporate governance and management incentives: evidence from the Scandinavian countries

Purpose The Scandinavian boards are known for their “best practices” for corporate governance. This paper aims to examine the management incentives behind corporate disclosure via an empirical study. Design/methodology/approach Many of the previous empirical work have focused on the US data, but the generalizability of such findings is geographically bounded. The set of management incentives in this paper is examined using a total sample of 123 local annual reports via some of the largest publicly listed firms in the Scandinavian countries between the years 2008-2012. Findings The findings of this study reveal that a firm’s financial success originates from the different attributes of corporate governance. Correlation and regression analyses reveal that in terms of firm size, leverage ratio, the existence of audit committee and the independence of CEO, there is a correlation between firm-specific factors and the level of disclosure. In contrast to the previous literature, a positive relationship between corporate disclosure and information asymmetry was not found. Originality/value The results of this study are valuable to the policymakers when implementing regulations on corporate governance control. The strategic implications of the findings on business decisions and future research are also discussed.