Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency: Key Factors Drive Transition of Technologies, but Better Training and Data Dissemination Can Increase Success
After the Soviet Union launched the first satellite into orbit in 1957, the U.S. government made a commitment to initiate, rather than react to, strategic technological surprises. DOD relies on DARPA s disruptive innovations to maintain this promise, backed by congressional appropriations of over $2...
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Zusammenfassung: | After the Soviet Union launched the first satellite into orbit in 1957, the U.S. government made a commitment to initiate, rather than react to, strategic technological surprises. DOD relies on DARPA s disruptive innovations to maintain this promise, backed by congressional appropriations of over $2.9 billion in fiscal year 2015 alone. In April 2015, DOD reported that U.S. technological superiority is again being challenged by potential adversaries and renewed efforts to improve its products. Meanwhile, GAO found deficiencies in DOD s technology transition processes that may hinder these efforts and DARPA s goals. Senate Report 113-176 included a provision for GAO to review DOD s technology transition processes, practices, and results. This report focuses on DARPA and assesses its (1) effectiveness at transitioning technologies since fiscal year 2010, including identifying factors that contribute to successful transitions, and (2) implementation of DOD policies and programs intended to facilitate technology transition. GAO reviewed DARPA programs completed since 2010; identified transition factors by analyzing program documentation for a random sample of 10 cases; reviewed DOD policies; and interviewed DOD officials. DARPA should regularly assess technology transition strategies, refine training requirements, and increase dissemination of technical data for completed programs. DOD did not agree to take GAO s recommended actions, which remain warranted, as discussed in the report.
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