Unraveling Al Qaeda's Strategy

Gauging the effectiveness of the U.S. strategy to counter international terrorism requires first an understanding of the objectives, ways and means, and implementation strategy of the adversary. In this case, the adversary is Al Qaeda and its network of affiliated regional terrorist organizations. Despite claims of ignorance by policy makers and pundits as to Al Qaeda's aims immediately following the attacks of September 11th, the evidence suggests the terrorists' intent is, and always has been, clear. Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and other Islamic extremist leaders, have repeatedly outlined their goals and grievances in exceedingly unambiguous terms. The first objective, in the narrow context, is to remove U.S. military presence from the Arabian Peninsula, and in the broader sense to eliminate or significantly reduce U.S. influence in the Islamic world. The second is to remove the secular governments in the region, principally stated as those of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and replace them with Islamic theocracies. The third is to eliminate the state of Israel and purge the Arab peninsula of Jewish and Christian influence. These objectives run inherently counter to U.S. vital national interests, not only in the Middle East but also globally. Thus, an overarching and coherent strategy is essential to counter the threat posed by Al Qaeda and its international extremist network. The U.S. counter-terror strategy leading up to the September 11th attacks was not only disjointed and unfocused but suffered from an inability to define the threat. As the United States comes to terms with the nature and root causes of global terrorism, subsequent counter-terror strategies should become more coherent and effective. Recent changes are encouraging but there is still a long way to go before the strategy matches the task and policies adhere to the strategy.