A Military in Charge of Itself: Civilian Control is a Russian Myth. Strategic Forum. Number 50, October 1995

The Russian military is presently freer from civilian control than at any time since 1918. Executive and legislative oversight is extremely limited, existing at a level that is far less pervasive than that of the former Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The failure of the Russian legislature (bot...

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Hauptverfasser: Belkin, Alexander A, Brusstar, James H
Format: Report
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:The Russian military is presently freer from civilian control than at any time since 1918. Executive and legislative oversight is extremely limited, existing at a level that is far less pervasive than that of the former Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The failure of the Russian legislature (both the Supreme Soviet that existed before October 1993, and the present Federal Assembly) to gain and exercise significant oversight authority is attributable to President Yeltsin's strong resistance to the idea--which is based on his belief that legislative oversight interferes with his authority. President Yeltsin has exercised little actual control over the conduct of the military's administrative and operational affairs, relying heavily on the uniformed military leadership in these matters. Yeltsin's hesitancy to get involved in military matters (such as the reform issue) undoubtedly stems from the fact that he recognizes the Defense Ministry's potential role as a kingmaker in Russian politics and wants to maintain good relations with it.