Deny Flight and Deliberate Force: An Effective Use of Airpower?

In October 1992 NATO agreed to assist the UN in monitoring a ban on all military flights over Bosnia-Herzegovina. NATO's involvement in Bosnia expanded over the next three years both in the range of missions performed and the political objectives behind those missions. This thesis examines how NATO air operations were planned coordinated and conducted and what effects these operations achieved. NATO's involvement can be grouped into four phases: (1) Passive monitoring of Bosnian airspace during Operation SKY MONITOR; October 1992 until April 1993; (2) Active patrolling of Bosnian airspace under Operation DENY FLIGHT, April 1993 until June 1993; (3) Continuation of DENY FLIGHT with the addition of NATO airstrikes in support of UNPROFOR June 1993 to July 1995; (4) Limited air offensive against the Bosnian-Serbs executed as Operation DELIBERATEFORCE in August and September 1995. Using the criteria of the tenets ofaerospace power and accomplishment of the stated mission, the thesis concludes that Operation DENY FLIGHT was not an effective use of airpower. While it did accomplish its stated mission, it failed to employ airpower in a concentrated and decisive manner. DELIBERATEFORCE was an effective use of airpower, accomplishing its stated mission and employing NATO air assets across the full range of capabilities in a concentrated fashion to achieve decisive results.