Ballistic Missile Defense: Records Indicate Deception Program Did Not Affect 1984 Test Results

The Army began researching nonnuclear means to intercept and destroy ballistic missiles during the 1960s. The so-called hit-to-kill technologies included infrared homing sensors that would permit an interceptor to guide itself into the path of an incoming warhead and collide with it. In 1976, the Ar...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Hauptverfasser: Spencer, J K, Walter, III, Charles A, Scire, Martin E, Thompson, Harold E
Format: Report
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:The Army began researching nonnuclear means to intercept and destroy ballistic missiles during the 1960s. The so-called hit-to-kill technologies included infrared homing sensors that would permit an interceptor to guide itself into the path of an incoming warhead and collide with it. In 1976, the Army began planning the Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE). The purpose was to demonstrate whether an interceptor with an onboard infrared homing sensor could locate and track a target, and then guide itself to a collision with the target representative of Soviet reentry vehicles. Four flight tests were conducted in 1983 and 1984. Each test involved launching a target from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, and a HOE interceptor from the Kwajalein Missile Range in the Pacific. The General Accounting Office investigated thru this report allegations that the Defense Department deceived Congress about HOE4 intercepting the target. Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Federal Services, Post Office and Civil Service, Committee on Government Affairs, U.S. Senate.