The New Strategic Concept and Nato Crisis Management
NATO refused to accept the proposal that its role had ended with the fall of the Iron Curtain and affirmed its deire to adapt to the new geography of the European security landscape. Some may classify this will to carry on as merely an institutional self-preservation instinct but others recognized t...
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
---|---|
Format: | Report |
Sprache: | eng |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext bestellen |
Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
Zusammenfassung: | NATO refused to accept the proposal that its role had ended with the fall of the Iron Curtain and affirmed its deire to adapt to the new geography of the European security landscape. Some may classify this will to carry on as merely an institutional self-preservation instinct but others recognized that an end to the Cold War did not imply an end to all hot ones. Fortunately and unfortunately, events in the summer of 1990 and the following year supported this contention and underscored the need for regional security arrangements of which NATO represented a unique model of success. The Alliance's New Strategic Concept (NSC) is one of the most significant indicators of how NATO plans to refashion itself for the challenges of the future. Published in November 1991, the NSC describes a shift in direction that reflects the new security environment but remains largely grounded in the Alliance's original principles and objectives. Crisis management and a renewed stress on political activities as the means for promoting and defending NATO interests represent the hallmarks of the new strategy. This paper examines in detail the relevant sections of the NSC and relate the concepts contained therein to general crisis management principles. |
---|