Crisis De-Escalation: A Relevant Concern in the New Europe?
This Note uses the neglected question of de-escalation dynamics to examine some military aspects of the broader subject of crisis management as it might be practiced by the NATO Alliance, and then goes on to explore the even larger question of the future role of the Alliance in European security. Eu...
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Zusammenfassung: | This Note uses the neglected question of de-escalation dynamics to examine some military aspects of the broader subject of crisis management as it might be practiced by the NATO Alliance, and then goes on to explore the even larger question of the future role of the Alliance in European security. Europe is undergoing what may be an extended period in relaxation of tensions between the two major power blocs. The past implausibility of rapid reduction of tensions should make one wary of forecasts that the current process is irreversible. The author draws an analogy between the lack of Alliance preparation for the pace of relaxation of tensions currently in progress in Europe and a similar lack of planning and exercising for de-escalation in a future crisis. The Note presents an argument for greater Alliance attention to its need for crisis management capabilities, and more specifically to the ability to manage de-escalation and force disengagement in crisis. A crisis is a necessary precondition for de-escalation, but the causes of future crises can't be known with certainty. Therefore, to suggest the capabilities the Alliance needs to de-escalate effectively and safely, the author posits four classes of scenarios: a major Soviet reentry in Eastern Europe, civil conflict in Eastern Europe, a local cross-border war in Europe, and an out-of-area conflict with NATO implications. These scenarios suggest three classes of needed improvements: planning, forces and hardware, and political frameworks.
Revised version of a paper presented at the NATO Crisis Management in a Changing Europe conference held in Brussels, Belgium, on 2-3 Apr 1990 as part of a multi-year project on Avoiding Nuclear War: Managing Conflict in the Nuclear Age. |
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