The Logic of Concepts: Case Studies in Engineering and Law

It has traditionally been supposed that concepts are learned from definitions or analyses; however, many contemporary philosophers and psychologist think that concepts are taught by means of exemplars, particular items which the community accepts as representative exemplifications of a concept. But this view is incomplete without a theory of how the transition is made from viewing group-licensed exemplars to possessing a concept which is shared with one's linguistic community. Further, although there is general agreement that the concepts of a given society may change with time, there is not agreement on how this conceptual evolution occurs and whether or not it is a rational process. The dissertation contributes to a resolution of these issues by arguing for a particular descriptive theory of the dynamic processes of conceptual activity. According to the theory proposed, a concept is a particular type of capacity. An idealized model of the items in a given exemplar set bridges the gap between examining the exemplars and possessing the associated capacity. Such models differ from any actual exemplars and, thus, stand in need of justification.