On the Performance and Security of Multiplication in GF(2N)

On the Performance and Security of Multiplication in GF(2N)

Multiplications in G F ( 2 N ) can be securely optimized for cryptographic applications when the integer N is small and does not match machine words (i.e., N < 32 ). In this paper, we present a set of optimizations applied to DAGS, a code-based post-quantum cryptographic algorithm and one of the...

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Veröffentlicht in:Cryptography 2018-09, Vol.2 (3), p.25
Hauptverfasser: Danger, Jean-Luc, El Housni, Youssef, Facon, Adrien, Gueye, Cheikh T., Guilley, Sylvain, Herbel, Sylvie, Ndiaye, Ousmane, Persichetti, Edoardo, Schaub, Alexander
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
cache-timing attacks
code-based cryptography
Computer Science
Cryptography and Security
finite field arithmetic
Information Theory
Mathematics
post-quantum cryptography
secure implementation
tower fields
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Zusammenfassung:Multiplications in G F ( 2 N ) can be securely optimized for cryptographic applications when the integer N is small and does not match machine words (i.e., N < 32 ). In this paper, we present a set of optimizations applied to DAGS, a code-based post-quantum cryptographic algorithm and one of the submissions to the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) standardization call.
ISSN:2410-387X
2410-387X
DOI:10.3390/cryptography2030025