Quantum rebound attacks on reduced‐round ARIA‐based hash functions

ARIA is a block cipher proposed by Kwon et al. at ICISC 2003 that is widely used as the national standard block cipher in the Republic of Korea. Herein, we identify some flaws in the quantum rebound attack on seven‐round ARIA‐DM proposed by Dou et al. and reveal that the limit of this attack is up to five rounds. Our revised attack applies to not only ARIA‐DM but also ARIA‐MMO and ARIA‐MP among the PGV models, and it is valid for all ARIA key lengths. Furthermore, we present dedicated quantum rebound attacks on seven‐round ARIA‐Hirose and ARIA‐MJH for the first time. These attacks are only valid for the 256‐bit key length of ARIA because they are constructed using the degrees of freedom in the key schedule. All our attacks are faster than the generic quantum attack in the cost metric of the time–space tradeoff. Hash functions are widely used in information security, including commitment schemes, zero‐knowledge proofs, integrity checks, and blockchain technology. However, a thorough analysis of their quantum security under different quantum computing environments is missing. To this end, researchers performed detailed quantum security analysis of reduced‐round block cipher‐based (ARIA) hash functions in different significant modes of quantum computing applications. Their analysis helps us understand the security of hash functions, which has significant implications in information security.