Joint decisions for Cold Chain Cross-border E-commerce with Overseas Warehouse Logistics Outsourcing
Considering a two-echelon supply chain consisting of one overseas warehouse logistics provider and one cross-border e-commerce retailer with cold chain products over a finite time horizon, this paper studies the optimal decision-making of logistics pricing, freshness-keeping effort level and cold ch...
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Veröffentlicht in: | E3S web of conferences 2021-01, Vol.261, p.3033 |
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Hauptverfasser: | , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | Considering a two-echelon supply chain consisting of one overseas warehouse logistics provider and one cross-border e-commerce retailer with cold chain products over a finite time horizon, this paper studies the optimal decision-making of logistics pricing, freshness-keeping effort level and cold chain product pricing under the Stackelberg game and the cooperative game, and makes a comparative analysis of the two models. Through two-person cooperative game of transferable payment, it is proved that (1)both the total supply chain profit and individual profit of the two parties are greater than the Stackelberg game;(2) the freshness level is higher than that of the Stackelberg game;(3) the logistics price is lower than that of the Stackelberg game;(4) e-commerce transaction scale (i.e. logistics demand scale) is higher than that of the Stackelberg game; and (5) the retail price of the cold chain product is lower than the Stackelberg game. Numerical results bear out the validity of the theoretical models. |
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ISSN: | 2267-1242 2555-0403 2267-1242 |
DOI: | 10.1051/e3sconf/202126103033 |