Disclosure of material information and dividend

The substitution hypothesis postulates that various corpo- rate governance forms and dividend disbursements serve as alternatives. Given that transparent information disclosure mitigates agency issues by lessening information asymmetry and fortifying corporate governance, this study aims to explore...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Mathematics and Modeling in Finance 2023-12, Vol.3 (2), p.149-160
Hauptverfasser: Shohre Hadidifard, Mona Parsaei, Nafiseh Shahmoradi
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:The substitution hypothesis postulates that various corpo- rate governance forms and dividend disbursements serve as alternatives. Given that transparent information disclosure mitigates agency issues by lessening information asymmetry and fortifying corporate governance, this study aims to explore the influence of Material Information Dis- closure which includes Groups A, B and Other Cases—characterized by their promptitude and significance—on dividends. Examining the period from 2018 to 2021 and encompassing a sample of 173 listed firms from the Tehran Stock Exchange, the findings affirm the substitution hypothesis. Moreover, Board independence is identified as a moderator in the rela- tionship between Material Information Disclosures and dividend. Fur- thermore, the findings indicate that during the Covid-19 period, Group A and Other Cases were more potent factors for dividend reduction than Group B disclosure.
ISSN:2783-0578
2783-056X
DOI:10.22054/jmmf.2024.76286.1109