Spasti soyuznika: plany pomoshhi Serbii v strategii Rossii osen'yu 1915 g

In the autumn of 1915, the powers of the Entente, including Russia, were not able to provide sufficiently effective assistance to Serbia. They were unable to save the country from occupation, even though in early 1915 the allies considered the possibility of having to take urgent measures to rescue...

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Veröffentlicht in:Istorija 20. veka (1983) 2016-08, Vol.34 (2/2016), p.9-26
1. Verfasser: Yur’evich Pavlov, Andrej
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng ; ger
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Zusammenfassung:In the autumn of 1915, the powers of the Entente, including Russia, were not able to provide sufficiently effective assistance to Serbia. They were unable to save the country from occupation, even though in early 1915 the allies considered the possibility of having to take urgent measures to rescue Serbia from a difficult situation. The Russian command supported the plan to send troops to Thessaloniki, but did not consider it necessary to use Russian soldiers for that purpose. Only due to pressure from allies, the Russians decided to send a small detachment to the Balkans. At that time, the hope of having a psychological effect on the Bulgarian army by adding Russian men to the Allied forces was still viable. The Russian command, however, considered very different options as a means of providing aid to Serbia. There were no less than five ideas: a strike against Austro-Hungarian forces in Galicia, a joint offensive with the Romanian army against Bulgaria, an attack on Bulgaria through Romanian territory, but without the participation of the Romanian army, a landing of Russian troops in the Bulgarian port of Varna and a landing of Russian troops near the Turkish ports on the Black Sea followed by an advance toward Bosphorus. Specifically, for these actions, Russia immediately formed a new VII army. Furthermore, the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander General Alekseyev suggested that allies radically rethink their war strategy and deliver powerful blows to Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary on the Salonika and Russian Southwestern fronts. For various reasons, not a single one of the above-mentioned plans was realized.
ISSN:0352-3160
2560-3647
DOI:10.29362/IST20VEKA.2016.2.PAV.9-26