Building relations between sense and non-sense in enactive cognition

In this paper we discuss the definition of nonsense and its relation to sense-making in the enactive theory of cognition. We take as a starting point the publication "Enactive Cognition at the Edge of Sense-Making: Making Sense of Non-Sense", organized by Massimiliano Cappuccio and Tom Froese, for being a pioneer work in relation to the theme. The importance of sense-making production for the relationship between perception and action is approached from different aspects. We discuss the central propositions of the theories of autopoiesis and enaction, from which are produced three ways of understanding nonsense from an enactive perspective. In these three approaches, contemporary authors suggest that nonsense is an intermediate or mediating element in processes of sense-making. Finally, we discuss the relationship between nonsense and sense, suggesting an articulation between the sensorimotor and linguistic domains based on a non-antagonistic definition of know-what and know-how.