Beyond the computational-representational brain: why affective neuroscience tells us attitudes must be explained on multiple levels

According to the computational theory of mind, all relevant cognition consists of executing some well-defined rules over representations which model (and have a direct correspondence to) the external world (Chalmers, 1996). [...]young adults make many unhealthy decisions when in a cold state because they fail to recognize how sickness would feel. [...]emotions are in many ways an emergent phenomenon, where any given emotional episode is a gestalt arising out of the idiosyncratic and pluralistic constellation of (cognitive, embodied, and situated) processes at that given moment (Barrett et al., 2007). The Role of Computation and Reduction Over Multiple Levels of Measurement/Organization Progress in science unequivocally depends on a continual examination of the evidence for the existing theories. [...]if there is to be a computational theory of the mind/brain of any scope, it must be subject to the same rigorous empirical examination that more naturalistic theories are subject to.