Corporate governance mechanisms and intellectual capital

Originality/value--With this study, we contribute to agency-stakeholder theory by analyzing a non-Anglo-Saxon market (characterized by strong executive power and low protection of minority shareholders and other stakeholders), stating that certain characteristics of Corporate Governance condition th...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:

Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:	Revista brasileira de gestão de negócios 2017-07, Vol.19 (65), p.394-414
Hauptverfasser:	Tejedo-Romero, Francisca, Araujo, Joaquim Filipe Ferraz Esteves, Emmendoerfer, Magnus Luiz
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Accounting and larger Boards of Directors. Originality/value – With this study Annual reports board of directors Boards of directors Capital markets Corporate governance Decision making Disclosure fewer independent directors information disclosure Intellectual capital ownership structure separation of functions between the chairman and the chief executive Stakeholders Stock exchanges Stockholders Studies the main results reveal that companies that disclose most information about their Intellectual Capital are those in which managers have greater managerial ownership we contribute to agency-stakeholder theory by analyzing a non-Anglo-Saxon market (characterized by strong executive power and low protection of minority shareholders and other stakeholders)
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
Tags:	Tag hinzufügen Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!

Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:	Originality/value--With this study, we contribute to agency-stakeholder theory by analyzing a non-Anglo-Saxon market (characterized by strong executive power and low protection of minority shareholders and other stakeholders), stating that certain characteristics of Corporate Governance condition the disclosure of Intellectual Capital.
ISSN:	1806-4892 1983-0807
DOI:	10.7819/rbgn.v19i65.3024