The stronger the ability, the greater the destructiveness? CEO ability and stock price crash risk

The impact of CEO ability on corporate behavior is dual-faceted. Based on the “rent-seeking hypothesis”, this paper focuses on the “dark side” of CEO ability and suggests that CEO ability may hurt corporate behavior. Using the DEA method to measure CEO ability and selecting Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2017 as a sample, we examine the relationship, mechanisms, and boundary conditions between CEO ability and stock price crash risk. Our study finds that CEO ability exacerbates stock price crash risk positively. Mechanism tests based on CEO tenure, agency conflict, and litigation risk reveal that CEO ability intensifies stock price crash risk for alleviating career concerns, seeking private gains, and risk avoidance, supporting the “rent-seeking hypothesis”. Boundary condition tests based on internal and external governance environments show that internal control quality and external audit supervision can play a governance role in mitigating the exacerbating effect of CEO ability on stock price crash risk. The conclusions are of significant importance for companies, relevant departments, and global market participants to strengthen governance and supervision to prevent the negative impact of CEO ability on stock prices, thereby promoting the stable development of global financial markets.