Research on Ecological Compensation in the Yellow River Basin Based on the Perspective of Game Theory
The Yellow River Basin is an important ecological function zone in China, and it plays an important role in the national economic and social development pattern. However, the over-utilization of water resources has made the ecological and environmental problems in the river basin more and more serio...
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Veröffentlicht in: | E3S web of conferences 2021-01, Vol.275, p.2002 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | The Yellow River Basin is an important ecological function zone in China, and it plays an important role in the national economic and social development pattern. However, the over-utilization of water resources has made the ecological and environmental problems in the river basin more and more serious. For this reason, the coordinated governance of the areas along the Yellow River basin has become very important. Based on the static game model, this paper conducts a comprehensive analysis of the coordinated governance of the Yellow River basin in the upstream and downstream areas, constructs a static game model of ecological compensation between the Shanxi and Henan governments under coordinated governance, and studies the feedback equilibrium strategies of the Shanxi and Henan governments. This article provides theoretical basis and suggestions for collaborative governance to achieve sustainable development. The game results show that: reducing the cost of protecting the ecological environment of the upstream basin, increasing the benefits of protecting the ecological environment, and increasing the amount of ecological compensation can promote the implementation of the ecological compensation policy between the upstream and downstream in the basin. |
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ISSN: | 2267-1242 2555-0403 2267-1242 |
DOI: | 10.1051/e3sconf/202127502002 |