Professional Moral Reasoning and (lack of) Empathy

Empathy is seen as a virtue or even a necessary skill in many professions. However, while proponents of the concept argue that it plays a fundamental role in our moral judgements, critics have objected that our empathy is easily manipulated and that our dispositions to empathise more strongly with t...

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Veröffentlicht in:Tidsskrift for professionsstudier 2020-11, Vol.16 (31), p.74-83
Hauptverfasser: Risberg, Eirik Julius, Nortvedt, Per
Format: Artikel
Sprache:dan ; eng
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Zusammenfassung:Empathy is seen as a virtue or even a necessary skill in many professions. However, while proponents of the concept argue that it plays a fundamental role in our moral judgements, critics have objected that our empathy is easily manipulated and that our dispositions to empathise more strongly with those close to or resembling ourselves makes it a poor moral guide. We argue that while not necessary for professional moral judgement, professional moral reasoning would be fundamentally amiss without the ability and willingness to perceive the situation from the perspective of those they are trained to serve.
ISSN:2446-0273
2446-0281
DOI:10.7146/tfp.v16i31.122759