Some dogs can find the payoff-dominant outcome in the Assurance game
Studies on coordination often present animals with the choice of either cooperating or remaining inactive; however, in nature, animals may also choose to act alone. This can be modeled with the Assurance game, an economic game that has recently been used to explore decision-making in primates. We in...
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Veröffentlicht in: | iScience 2024-01, Vol.27 (1), p.108698-108698, Article 108698 |
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Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | Studies on coordination often present animals with the choice of either cooperating or remaining inactive; however, in nature, animals may also choose to act alone. This can be modeled with the Assurance game, an economic game that has recently been used to explore decision-making in primates. We investigated whether dyads of pet dogs coordinate in the Assurance game. Pairs were presented with two alternatives: they could individually solve an apparatus baited with a low-value reward (Hare) or they could coordinate to solve a cooperative apparatus baited with a high-value reward for each dog (Stag). All individuals matched their partner’s choices, but after controlling for side bias, only four out of eleven dyads consistently coordinated on the payoff-dominant strategy (Stag-Stag). Thus, some dogs are capable of finding coordinated outcomes, as do primates, at least when their partner’s actions are visible and coordination results in the biggest payoff for both individuals.
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•We used economic games to study decision-making in dog-dog coordination•Pet dogs coordinated with their partner’s choices in the Assurance game•Four out of eleven dyads consistently coordinated on Stag, like some primates do•This payoff-dominant outcome is likely achieved with simple mechanisms
Canine behavior; Biological sciences; Zoology; Cognitive neuroscience |
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ISSN: | 2589-0042 2589-0042 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.isci.2023.108698 |