Ibn ‘Arabī on Epistemic Disagreement
In an epistemic disagreement, if the counterparts insist on their rightfulness and falsification of other’s opinions, the cognitive contradictions often end up with conflict. If one of them ignores his belief and accept other’s beliefs unconditionally, it leads to domination and sovereignty of other...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Pizhūhishnāmah-i falsafah-i dīn 2019-10, Vol.17 (2), p.143-156 |
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Zusammenfassung: | In an epistemic disagreement, if the counterparts insist on their rightfulness and falsification of other’s opinions, the cognitive contradictions often end up with conflict. If one of them ignores his belief and accept other’s beliefs unconditionally, it leads to domination and sovereignty of others. Here, Ibn ‘Arabī proposes a third way. Despite sticking to his belief, he considers other’s beliefs as opportunity for further excellence and knowledge. In Ibn ‘Arabī’s system of thought, every creature is ontologically a manifestation of a name or some names of God. Also, epistemologically, their understanding of God depends on their ability to receive the divine manifestations. Ibn ‘Arabī accepted the idea of inaccessibility to the whole truth by connecting the discrepancy of ideas and beliefs to the discrepancy of talents and manifestations. This idea can be one of his most important bases in addressing epistemic disagreement. |
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ISSN: | 2228-6578 2228-6586 |
DOI: | 10.30497/prr.2020.2727 |