Understanding the Impact of Vaccination and Self-Defense Measures on Epidemic Dynamics Using an Embedded Optimization and Evolutionary Game Theory Methodology

Explaining how individual choice and government policy can appear in the same context in real society is one of the most challenging scientific problems. Controlling infectious diseases requires effective prevention and control measures, including vaccination and self-defense measures. In this conte...

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Veröffentlicht in:Vaccines (Basel) 2023-08, Vol.11 (9), p.1421
Hauptverfasser: Kabir, K. M. Ariful, Islam, MD Shahidul, Sharif Ullah, Mohammad
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Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:Explaining how individual choice and government policy can appear in the same context in real society is one of the most challenging scientific problems. Controlling infectious diseases requires effective prevention and control measures, including vaccination and self-defense measures. In this context, optimal control strategies incorporating vaccination and self-defense measures have been proposed using the framework of evolutionary game theory. This approach accounts for individuals’ behavior and interactions in a population. It can provide insights into the effectiveness of different strategies for controlling the spread of infectious diseases. The optimal control strategy involves balancing the costs and benefits of vaccination, considering the dynamic interplay between the infected and susceptible populations. By combining evolutionary game theory with optimal control theory, we can identify the optimal allocation of resources for vaccination and self-defense measures, which can maximize the control of infectious diseases while minimizing costs. The model is utilized to analyze public health policies diseases, such as vaccination and self-defense strategies, to mitigate the spread of infectious in the context of delayed decision-making.
ISSN:2076-393X
2076-393X
DOI:10.3390/vaccines11091421