Response to Dennett on Free Will Skepticism

What is at stake in the debate between those, such as Sam Harris and me, who contend that we would lack free will on the supposition that we are causally determined agents, and those that defend the claim that we might then retain free will, such as Daniel Dennett? I agree with Dennett that on the s...

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Veröffentlicht in:Rivista internazionale di filosofia e psicologia 2017-12, Vol.8 (3), p.259-265
1. Verfasser: Derk Pereboom
Format: Artikel
Sprache:ger
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Zusammenfassung:What is at stake in the debate between those, such as Sam Harris and me, who contend that we would lack free will on the supposition that we are causally determined agents, and those that defend the claim that we might then retain free will, such as Daniel Dennett? I agree with Dennett that on the supposition of causal determination there would be robust ways in which we could shape, control, and cause our actions. But I deny that on this supposition we would have the control in action required for us to basically deserve to be blamed, praised, punished or rewarded. In this response, I argue that this is the core issue that divides compatibilists and incompatiblists about free will and causal determination, and that the incompatibilist position is the right one to accept.
ISSN:2039-4667
2239-2629
DOI:10.4453/rifp.2017.0021